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THE INTERNATIONAL STYLE IN POSTWAR LAW
AND POLICY: JOHN JACKSON AND THE FIELD OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
David Kennedy-
I come to international economic law as an outsider, as an American
public international lawyer interested in the constitutional structure of the
international legal order. I come with all the fascinations and prejudices
public law scholars bring to the traditions of international private law,
commercial arbitration, international finance, trade. Nevertheless, my
sense is that modem internationalists, both public and private, share a
pragmatic sensibility or style, at once down to earth or case by case and
technocratically sophisticated. I come to international economic law to
explore this sensibility, its attitudes towards internationalization, its
thoughts about politics and the role of international law.
At the same time, for all their similarities, the traditions and intellec-
tual styles of public international law and international economic law
remain estranged, caught in an elaborate pas-de-deux of public and pri-
vate, metropolitan and cosmopolitan sensibilities. In this piece, I focus
on the voice of one international economic law intellectual, Professor
John Jackson of the University of Michigan Law School, as exemplified
in his short 1989 treatise on international economic law, The World
Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations. I
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am interested in Jackson's relations with the discipline of public interna-
tional law, and in the distinctive style of international policy science he
develops-both its promise and its peril.
John Jackson's book on trade law' ranks with the best contemporary
international policy scholarship, as the words on the cover indicate, at
once an "introduction," a "treatise," and a "reference." A classic work in
the field of international economic law by perhaps its leading North
American academic practitioner, the book exemplifies the ideas and
practices which make contemporary international economic law a distinc-
tive genre. Fifty years after Kelsen's lectures, the book expresses the
wisdom of the post-war international economic order, poised for the
challenges of the next century.
A senior law professor at the University of Michigan, Jackson pre-
sides over the field of trade law in the United States. Indeed, it was
Jackson who largely invented the field, transforming his experiences
with the United States Trade Representative's office from a narrowing
regulatory specialty into a recognized subject of legal study. In many
ways, we can see Jackson's as a classic academic project-founding and
developing a field or school. He began by getting trade law recognized
as a significant field of study for American lawyers. In The World Trad-
ing System, he goes further, claiming, quite modestly and tentatively, to
represent what he terms "international economic law."' Seen this way, it
1. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIc RELATIONS (1989).
2. Writing in 1948, Georg Schwarzenberger makes "the case for recognizing a
special branch of law" addressing international economic relations. Georg
Schwarzenberger, The Provence and Standards of International Economic Law, 2
INT'L L.Q. 402, 405 (1948). In the familiar mode of a social science funding propos-
al, Schwarzenberger juxtaposes the bewildering array of world events with a scholarly
inattention that demands remedy. Schwarzenberger opened his article with an an-
nouncement:
International economic relations are front page news. The Marshall Plan, de-
valuation of the French franc, Geneva and Havana Trade Conferences, Anglo-
Russian trade relations, the Andes Trade and International Wheat Agreements,
inter-Allied discussions on German currency, foreign assets in Austria, national-
ization of British and American owned property in Eastern and South Eastern
Europe and proposals for a Western Customs Union are but a few items select-
ed at random. Each of these problems has its intricate legal aspects, and they
all are within the province of public international law. It may not be inappro-
priate, therefore, to inquire whether the science and practice of international law
are properly equipped to deal with this host of topical issues.
The answer to this question can hardly be an unqualified affirma-
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is not difficult to imagine his strategy, both institutionally and intellectu-
ally.
At the institutional level, he developed his teaching materials into a
casebook3 and taught numerous students who would follow him into
law teaching. He has participated in the conference scene for American
law professors, presiding and speaking at numerous panels on trade law
which place him between the world of trade practice and the academy.
Although experienced in American government, he has been careful to
distance himself from the positions of the United States Trade Represen-
tative, acting as a sort of pragmatic conscience for liberal trade, without
becoming identified with any one issue or policy dispute.
Academically, his project faced a number of obstacles. When he be-
gan, none of the options available to students interested in the business
or commercial side of international law-what might be called "private
international law" outside the United States-could easily be imitated by
trade law. There were advanced "international" offerings in recognized
areas of domestic law, international tax being the most well developed.
Trade was far too specialized a regulatory subject, however, to be rou-
tinely offered as part of the domestic law curriculum. Jackson's main
competitors were general courses in transnational law or international
business transactions.4 Each represented itself as a broad subject, ad-
dressing structural and institutional issues beyond the details of particular
tive ....
Id. at 402. Schwarzenberger continued:
A glance at the textbooks of the inter-war period and at the syllabuses in
international law of the law schools of the leading universities all over the
world will indicate how the challenge was met. It is probably no exaggeration
to say that it was done largely by ignoring the problem ....
It would seem that the time has come for the establishment of separate
branches of international law, supplementing treatises on, and teaching in, the
general principles of international law. Such specialization will not only result
in providing more adequate knowledge in the narrower fields, but is likely to
enrich insight into the nature, functions and principles of the law of nations as
such ....
Id. at 403-04.
Eighteen years later, Schwarzenberger would cover the same ground more compre-
hensively and more confidently. See Schwarzenberger, supra.
3. JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEi, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATION-
AL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEx-r (2d ed. 1986).
4. Cf. ALAN C. SWAN & JOHN F. MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1991) (interna-
tional-business-transactions approach).
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transactions and deals. There was a good deal of overlap, transnational
law focusing slightly more on courts and regulatory conflicts, interna-
tional business transactions more on international contracts, property, and
business regulation. Both dealt primarily with American law, and both
self-consciously straddled a number of domestic law fields bearing on
international transactions. When Jackson began, an American law school
with limited room in the curriculum for international "specialty" courses
would almost certainly have offered (faculty resources being equal) any
of these courses before international trade.
The achilles heel of the operation was limited attention to both for-
eign law and the public international law structure. Neither transnational
law nor international business transactions gave much attention to inter-
national public law rules, other than those covering expropriation and
various quixotic efforts to monitor multinational companies. Where trea-
ties or executive agreements were relevant, both were more interested in
the American reception of international rules than in their international
generation or foreign applicability. All of these courses had begun as
efforts to render the American legal curriculum less parochial, but each
had drifted back to domestic law at the highest point of the American
century under the pressure of student interest, the perceived influence of
American law internationally, and the perceived poverty, even irrele-
vance, of the public international law and comparative law fields in the
same years.
Jackson's success was to exploit these weaknesses without invoking
either comparative law or public international law. Comparative law had
marginalized itself by stressing either a deep foreign expertise incapable
of being generalized, or a savvy knowledge of how business is conduct-
ed in a particular region unlikely to be seen as part of the basic cur-
riculum. Public international law had reacted to the wide American
perception of its irrelevance to the conduct of foreign policy by pro-
liferating specializations (law of the sea, human rights, etc.) and becom-
ing itself immersed in American public law by focusing on the foreign
relations law of the United States.
In the GATT, Jackson had an international institutional apparatus and
regulatory machinery which was relatively unknown, and which was
linked to an American statutory regime. Public international law teachers
generally avoided the economic institutions, except to comment on their
constitutional structure or voting procedures, unless they were interested
in development issues, in which case they would likely focus on the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, rather than the
GATT.
[VOL. 10:2
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Jackson's academic achievement was to displace international business
transactions and the tradition of transnationalism by capturing the intel-
lectual energy and hope for international public law and the felt necessi-
ty of dealing with the "foreign" without losing the basic American legal
materials and the national private law order. By focusing largely on the
reciprocal interaction of national governmental and legislative institu-
tions, he imagined an international "trade constitution" which brought
international trade into the domestic public order to revitalize it as an
international system.
At the same time, he recast clashes between national regimes not as
political disputes awaiting international regulatory harmonization nor as
deeply estranged cultural differences to be compared, but as an imper-
fect "interface" mechanism through which different legal cultures related
to one another. He was consequently able to develop a broad theory of
international economic relations from the details of trade law which
would seem liberal, pluralistic, and internationalist by contrast to the
tradition of transnationalism, while seeming pragmatic and realist about
commercial matters when contrasted with public international law. In
short, he made international trade a "regime" you could study, like the
European Economic Community, as a working example of international
regulation.
As a result, we can anticipate the distance travelled from the tradi-
tions of postwar public international law. The discipline of trade and
economic law has displaced public international law, and management of
economic relations has replaced the problems of peace and war. Tradi-
tionally, we read the move to international economic law as the dis-
placement of one discipline by another-from public law to private law,
from a concern with national sovereignty to an international order re-
moved from sovereign forms, from law to policy, and from adjudication
to administration, with economics replacing politics as law's sidekick
and nemesis.
At the same time, however, we sense a move away from, or perhaps
beyond, these sorts of distinctions. As this familiar story goes, interna-
tional law was preoccupied with the distinctions between public and
private, law and politics, diplomacy and trade, international and national.
For contemporary international economic law, these distinctions have
been relaxed, or set aside. The contemporary international policy scien-
tist--however much he prefers the economic to the legal, the legal to
the political, the private to the public, the international to the national,
and so forth-is fully at ease with a relaxed and ad hoc mixture of all
these elements. In this, the world of Jackson seems not simply a dif-
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ferent or parallel discipline, but seems also more up to date and more
sophisticated than that of his public international law predecessors.
I. PREFACE AND INTRODUCTION: THE NEW DISCIPLINE
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
Above all, Jackson's book offers a succinct, readable description of
the various elements which have come to comprise international eco-
nomic law. Of the fourteen chapters (308 pages), only the introduction
and conclusion seem at all theoretical or speculative (a total of thirty-six
pages). Even here the voice is pragmatic, ushering us into an existing
"trading system." Gone is the pubic international lawyer's elaborate
speculation on the existence and nature of international law. The intro-
duction is entitled "The Policies and Realities of International Economic
Regulation."5
Jackson speaks directly of international law only in the penultimate
section of this first chapter, after introducing liberal trade theory and the
science of policy in international economic affairs which will be the
main background and subject for the book. The section, labeled "Inter-
national Law and International Economic Relations: An Introduction, '
gives us some important clues about the relationship between Jackson's
project and that of public international law. The section has three parts:
"International Economic Law,"7 "International Law and Economic Rela-
tions,"8 and "Functional Approach to International Law."9 Jackson takes
up international law just after introducing the term international eco-
nomic law to name the discipline to be covered in his book, by way of
contrast. He opens: "By way of introduction to the international law
bearing on economic affairs, and as part of an historical introduction to
it, several observations may be useful to the reader."'" International law
will be history, background.
He introduces us to the basic "sources" of international law, treaties
and custom, but notes that "[u]nfortunately, customary international law
norms are very often ambiguous and controverted."" Indeed, often
5. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 1.
6. Id. at 21.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 22.
9. Id. at 23.
10. Id. at 22.
11. Id.
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"scholars and practitioners disagree not only about their meaning but
even about their existence."' 2 As it turns out, in economic affairs,
there is very little in the way of substantive international law customary
norms (that is, norms other than ones dealing with procedures for govern-
ment-to-government relations, or of relations among firms or individuals
in the few cases when international law is deemed to apply to firms or
individuals). 3
As a result, the reader can readily ignore the elaborate speculations of
the international law field, concerning himself only with the relatively
straightforward world of treaties.
Here, Jackson introduces his "functional approach.""' People, he tells
us, particularly "the public," sometimes question the importance and
effectiveness of international law, and Jackson acknowledges that this is
not surprising, given how often these rules are violated." But, he sug-
gests, this is less true when "reciprocity and a desire to depend on other
nations' observance of rules" leads "nations to observe rules even when
they don't want to."'" This seems particularly the case "in the context
of economic behavior" where rules have important "operational func-
tions," providing "predictability or stability" without which "trade or
investment flows might be even more risky."'7
Broadly speaking, these paragraphs offer an unexceptional introduction
to the sorts of arguments international lawyers make for the efficacy of
their discipline in the pragmatic age. For the international lawyer, the
only surprising elements are Jackson's suggestion that there are few in-
ternational law rules of relevance to economic affairs (dismissing the
broad range of contemporary international law sources and procedures in
favor of treaties), and his further suggestion that those which do exist
are perhaps particularly likely to be followed for reasons of economic
self-interest.
Public international lawyers have developed what they term a "func-
tional" approach in ways precisely counter to Jackson's first suggestion.
Rather than emphasizing the narrow range of substantive rules about
which one might be skeptical, they have celebrated the importance of
sources and procedural rules in establishing a regime of international
12. Id.
13. Id. at 23.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 24.
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public order, even in the absence of agreement on particular substantive
norms. It is to the project of elaborating substantive rules-whether ex-
tending the list of human rights or articulating more precise standards
for air traffic safety-that international lawyers have been beckoned by
polemics for two generations. Jackson seems simply to be setting this
procedural regime and this project of international public order aside-to
be replaced by a network of market relations for which only a few
substantive rules will be necessary.
Jackson rather weakly defends the second proposition by reference to
the traditional arguments for free trade which he has earlier introduced:
"If such 'liberal trade' goals (for reasons discussed in section 1.2) con-
tribute to world welfare, then it follows that rules which assist such
goals should also contribute to world welfare."'" At this point,
Jackson's argument goes off in two quite different directions.
If we follow his parentheses and return to section 1.2, we find a
lengthy discussion of "liberal trade" policy and the theory of compara-
tive advantage. 9 Jackson is extremely modest about the conclusions
which can be drawn from economic theory, even though he has warned
us that "the basic economic propositions of international trade poli-
cy . . . will lie at the center of this exposition." '2 Although the "theory
does have strong intuitive appeal,"' Jackson is careful to summarize
major criticisms and point out obvious weaknesses. Jackson notes that
"[o]f course, this basic 'economic goal' is not the only goal of interna-
tional trade policy,"' an assertion he discusses in a subsection entitled
"Competing Policy Goals and Noneconomic Objectives." '23
Liberal trade theory is defended only as a fact. Thus, for example,
"regardless of their validity or intellectual persuasiveness, there is no
question that [economic arguments for liberal trade] . . . have been
influential. The basic 'liberal trade' philosophy is constantly reiterated
by government and private persons, even in the context of a justification
for departing from it!"24 He continues: "[T]here can be little doubt of
the general policy underpinnings of the post-World War II international
economic system . . . ."' As a result, Jackson does not need, among
18. Id.
19. See id. at 8-17.
20. Id. at 6.
21. Id. at 13.
22. Id. at 9.
23. See id. at 17-21.
24. Id. at 8.
25. Id. at 9.
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his qualifications, to introduce the reader to any conflicts or counter-
arguments within economics; they have been netted out by consensus.
Economic theory, now a possible justification for international law, is a
matter of observation. He does not claim that economics tells us that
some international law rules will be followed, only that some legal rules
will be part of a liberal trade system.
Jackson is not a "law and economics" scholar in any traditional sense.
He does not follow the entailments of specific arguments of economic
theory for particular rules, nor assess aspects of legal culture in econom-
ic terms. Economics plays a much more general role in the text. Jackson
deploys economic theory much as public international lawyers deploy re-
flections about the way "nations behave," or anthropological notions
about how societies develop-to establish a factual baseline, even if a
mythical one, for his international regime and momentum for his policy
proposals. He validates in a general way those rules and those aspects
of the overall public international law system which seem, for whatever
theoretical or fanciful reasons, necessary or desirable to promote trade
and advance, in Jackson's definition of "liberal trade," "the goal to
minimize the amount of interference of governments in trade flows that
cross national borders."27 Where international law is useful to that end,
it too has become simply a matter of fact--clear, orderly, without signif-
icant internal contradiction or bias, a significant part of the policy con-
text.
If we continue reading, rather than following the parentheses, we
come to what seems a more direct discussion of the relevance of law, a
rather confused meditation on the relationship between theory and prac-
tice suggested by Maitland's phrase "the 'seamless web' of the law."'2
Jackson reminds us that despite the importance of "coming face to face
with the complexity and coarseness of reality with the aim of solving
real problems there is always the risk of losing sight of the forest be-
cause one's gaze focuses on particular trees." Anecdotes can be as
misleading as theories. "Thus we see the dilemma of a book like
this."
30
26. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY
(2d ed. 1979).
27. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 8.
28. Id. at 24 (quoting F.W. Maitland, A Prologue to a History of English Law,
14 LAW Q. REv. 13, 13 (1898)).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 25.
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In response, Jackson will offer "a little of both."'" The book will be
neither deductive nor inductive, but will "state issues or questions...
without in all cases trying to formulate answers." '3 The result is a
number of "themes or problems," widely divergent in type, including
"[t]he dilemma of rule versus discretion," the "'effectiveness' of the
trade rules," the need to relate conflicting policy goals, some of which
"have to do with the legal and constitutional structure of the 'system,"'
and so forth.33 The result of this direct theoretical excursion into the
seamless web of the law is a dispersion of dilemmas in the face of
which one can only be modest. Jackson concludes the introduction on a
typical note: "Thus I have expressed a sort of 'consumer warning.'
Don't expect too much of this book."'34
Jackson has differentiated his new discipline from public international
law in two steps. First he treats those rules which seem, either actually
or hypothetically, to serve a liberal trade system (i.e., those which either
reduce barriers to trade or enhance security and predictability). Such
rules should properly be a focus of study for the international economic
lawyer. Jackson suggests no difficulty, at this level, in figuring out
which rules those are. Where, on the other hand, there are difficulties
and confusions, we have the enduring dilemmas of policy-dilemmas
less to be solved than, in Jackson's terminology, managed. The rest of
public international law-its system of procedural order, its theoretical
arguments for itself, its polemics for personal commitment-has been set
aside, promoted, or demoted. For the international economic system, this
international law seems relevant only as introductory background, as
history, or as theory.
Unlike the powerful argument for international law among nations
made by public international lawyers, Jackson makes the argument for
international economic law softly, less rejecting international law and
setting up a parallel discipline, a preferable optic, than describing inter-
national law's general displacement and restricted arena of continued
relevance. Indeed, when Jackson speaks about these matters, he stresses
the law's entanglement with economic policy. The book's preface opens
this way: "Trade law and policy involves a remarkably intricate inter-
play of international law, national law, and nonlaw disciplines, including
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 26.
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economics and political science."'35
He introduces the new discipline of international economic law as
something to which "one has heard references" in "recent years," stress-
ing that "[u]nfortunately, this phrase is not well defined," 6 and has
been used so vaguely that it might refer to "almost all international
law."37 He suggests, but does not embrace, a "more restrained" defini-
tion, involving only those matters relevant to cross-border
transactions.' In the end, he takes his cue from fact rather than theory:
"In any event, the subject of international trade, whether in goods or in
services (or both), is clearly at the core of international economic
law."39 His book will build from the rules which concern this core.
The key points here are Jackson's transformation of theoretical prop-
ositions into factual observations, his dismissal of international law's
classic concerns as matters of theory, and his correlative modesty about
the alternative he advances. In one sense, this is simply the work of one
realist displacing another. Jackson, like Kelsen, wants to move things
from theoretical concerns to practical realities. Jackson's greater infor-
mality, shorter theoretical prolegomena, etc., simply mark th progress
from public international law. In another sense, however, Jackson has
changed roads altogether, for now the driving image is not a public
order of sovereigns, but a market of economic actors.
Jackson characterizes the introduction and the three chapters which
follow as concerned with "the institutional and legal structure of the
world trade system." The next seven chapters take up "the most im-
portant" of the "substantive regulatory policies of that system."' His
final chapter offers "conclusions and perspectives." Beyond the appar-
ent logic of this division-a general policy framework followed by
specific policies--the three structural chapters develop the theoretical
argument sketched in the introduction, illustrating both the similarity of
Jackson's pragmatism as well as the differences he establishes between
the old discipline of international law and the new international econom-
ic law. The later substantive chapters suggest the geographic and con-
ceptual contours of the international economic law regime Jackson
35. Id. at ix.
36. Id. at 21.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 115.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 299-308.
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II. THE INSTITUTIONAL CHAPTERS: PHASES IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRAGMATIST VOICE AND
POLEMIC-NEW RELATIONS AMONG SOME
FAMILIAR DISTINCTIONS
Like other modem pragmatists, Jackson is deeply skeptical, even
rudely dismissive, of the traditional distinctions (international/national,
economic/legal, law/politics) which might be thought necessary for "in-
ternational economic law" to have an autonomous coherence. Like many,
however, Jackson finds such distinctions easier to disparage than to
eliminate.
The three chapters which follow the introduction, presenting the "in-
stitutional and legal structure" for trade, both dismiss and reinstantiate
these distinctions. They are not, of course, organized directly to make a
theoretical argument of this sort. Rather, their titles suggest a descriptive
and logical general structure:
The International Institutions of Trade: The GATI 3
National Institutions"
Rule Implementation and Dispute Resolution
45
Still, after reading the introduction, the reader might be forgiven for
finding the list somewhat puzzling. For one thing, in the first chapter
Jackson is adamant that "national" and "international" dimensions of the
trade system neither could nor should be distinguished:
An even less fortunate distinction of subject matter is often made between
international and domestic rules. This book will not indulge in that sepa-
ration. In fact, domestic and international rules and legal institutions of
economic affairs are inextricably intertwined. It is not possible to under-
stand the real operation of either of these sets of rules in isolation from
the other.'
He adds that "[t]he tendency for academic subject matters to separate
international from national or domestic issues becomes an important
source of misunderstanding."47
At the same time, the last of these chapters, concerning dispute reso-
43. Id. ch. 2.
44. Id. ch. 3.
45. Id. ch. 4.
46. Id. at 22.
47. Id. at 25-26.
POSTWAR LAW AND POLICY
lution and rule implementation, although surely general, is surprisingly
legal in its focus. Indeed, the problem of "compliance" with intenation-
al normse and the importance of dispute resolution mechanisms in the
process of rule implementation has become a central preoccupation of
the public international law field. In a habit which follows the tradition-
al interest in the establishment of an international court, dispute resolu-
tion and compliance are selected for special treatment in international
law texts not because they are particularly germane or well developed in
given substantive areas, but because, as primitive and decentralized
judiciary substitutes, they seem to provide the most practical arena for
investigating the efficacy of international law as a whole. By contrast,
Jackson had introduced law almost apologetically in the introduction:
Thus the purpose of this book is to examine the theory and real imple-
mentation of the policies of international trade in our contemporary world
in a way that attempts to explain how the theories have been effectively
constrained by the processes of real human institutions, especially legal
institutions. The perspective of this book is that of a legal scholar, of
course. (My "comparative advantage" would not realistically support any
other perspective.) Yet my goal-not too ambitious, I hope--is to explore
the multidisciplinary context of trade-policy rules .... I will state the
basic economic propositions of international trade policy, and they will lie
at the center of this exposition.
Given Jackson's insistence that problems of "policy," oriented around
specific dilemmas or "themes" of practical relevance, are central to his
conception of international economic law, it is surprising to find the
traditional preoccupation of public law regime builders so central to his
discussion of the "'constitutional structure' of the contemporary world
trade system."'5 The deployment of dismissed distinctions is, of course,
familiar in contemporary legal pragmatism. The difficulty is to determine
precisely how and where, and with what strategy, the two attitudes are
deployed.
Jackson's second chapter introduces the "international institutions of
trade" by focusing on the GAIT. It reads like a disquisition on what
may and may not be considered either "law" or a "legal institution,"
even as the descriptive focus on the GATT makes law and questions
about what might count as "legal" seem both theoretical and histori-
48. See id. at 7.
49. Id. at 6.
50. Id. at 7.
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cal.5 The chapter responds, in a diffuse way, to an opening paradox:
"Although the GATT is featured in headlines of major daily newspapers
as the most important treaty governing international trade relations, the
fact is that the GAT" treaty as such has never come into force."'52 We
might dismiss this as the sort of professional trivia or historical detail
that experts and insiders are supposed to know. Indeed, Jackson "must
hasten to clarify, however, that the obligations of GATT are clearly
binding under international law,"'53 but the "no-it-isn't/yes-it-is" theme
continues throughout the chapter.
Indeed, we get almost no substantive information about the GAIT' in
the chapter on the international trade system. That is postponed for later
more particular chapters. This general treatment focuses on the broad
framework which holds those substantive practices together, much like
the typical public international treatise which begins with procedural
matters, and then covers particular substantive topics as illustrations. At
first glance, however, Jackson's general structure seems far less ad-
vanced, in part because he eschews discussion of international law's
procedural elements as irrelevant to a system structured by a market
rather than by inter-governmental accommodation. As a result, he seems
preoccupied with the legality of the structure-precisely the issue mod-
em international lawyers are most obsessive about forgetting.
Jackson tells us that the international trade regime is a complex edi-
fice of institutions and treaties, of which the GATr is the most impor-
tant.54 Yet, he goes on, the GATT is not really an institution and not
really a binding treaty, partly as a result of historical oversight and
error. The GATT, Jackson maintains, had "flawed constitutional begin-
nings." '55 Still, Jackson continues, "any fair definition" would deem
GATr an "international organization." '5 Although in theory "not an
'organization"' and therefore without "members," '57 the GAIT has con-
tracting parties, and we can list nations which participate in GAIT
obligations." These contracting parties can act jointly, often by majori-
ty vote.59 Jackson concludes that it is actually better to think of the
51. Id. at 27.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 27-29.
55. Id. at 30.
56. Id. at 38.
57. Id. at 45.
58. Id. at 45-46.
59. Id. at 48.
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GATT as an "elaborate group of committees, working parties, panels,
and other bodies."
If we look at legal norms, Jackson maintains, the GATr's many and
varied bilateral commitments and tariff concessions are the key legal
obligations; beyond that there is simply a "code of conduct."' This
code of conduct, however, does have several key obligations. Of course,
these vary a great deal in application" and are often not complied
with.' There is now also a great deal of bilateral breach brought about
by the so-called "voluntary export restraints."' In any event, he contin-
ues, the official sphere of application of the GATIT code is rather lim-
ited. It applies only to products and is binding only on governments.0
It does, however, greatly influence other sectors and actors as well. Still,
it is riddled with exceptions-grandfather clauses, waivers, balance-of-
payments exceptions, and many more.Y There are also many loopholes
and sectoral exemptions for products, including agriculture and tex-
tiles.67 The point, Jackson tells us, is that the GATT is "complex, con-
stantly changing, and furnishes both pitfalls and opportunities for con-
structive diplomacy."
Like many public international lawyers, Jackson sets aside issues of
law's specificity. He does so, however, neither in recognition of the
reality of national behavior and the existence of a sophisticated proce-
dural regime, nor out of any personal peace-orientation or optimistic
desire to view the glass half-full. Jackson relaxes the sharp distinction
between the legal and the nonlegal in his appreciation for the apparent
maturity or flexibility of an international system not preoccupied with its
own binding force. He does so because it seems that the existing inter-
national trade system, in this way the most sophisticated of international
regimes, is itself a m6lange of law and non-law, institutions and non-
institutions-a scattered array of obligations and sites for bilateral or
multilateral engagement. Thus, for example, in looking at the last com-
pleted round of GATT negotiations, Jackson concludes that the "overall
impact of these results was to substantially broaden the scope of cover-
60. See id.
61. See id. at 41.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. Id. at 42.
66. See id. at 42-43.
67. Id. at 44-45.
68. Id. at 30.
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age of the GATT system" despite the fact that "[t]he legal status of
these various agreements and understandings . is not always clear."
At other times, however, Jackson quite firmly defends law's specifici-
ty, often at precisely the moment he is most relaxed about the distinc-
tion between national and international. It is as if, for Jackson, the end
of one distinction requires the reinstatement of the other. This relation-
ship is most apparent in Jackson's notion of the world's increasing
"interdependence,"7 introduced as a factual observation at the very start
of the book: "[T]he world has become increasingly interdependent."'
He notes that trade "constitutes over 50 percent of the gross national
product of some countries," and is significant even for countries (like
the United States) with large internal markets.' Nevertheless, interde-
pendence is not primarily a matter of statistics. It is rather a matter of
interlocking political fears. "[G]overnment leaders, businessmen, and
almost anyone else feels some anxiety about those mysterious foreign
influences that can affect daily lives so dramatically."' 3 Interdependence
is significant because with it "has come vulnerability."'74
National economies do not stand alone: economic forces move rapidly
across borders to influence other societies ....
... Economic interdependence creates great difficulties for national
governments. National political leaders find it harder to deliver programs
to respond to needs of constituents. Businesses fail or flail in the face of
greater uncertainties. Some laboring citizens cannot understand why it is
harder to achieve the standard of living to which they aspire."
This interdependence has been achieved over the past forty years in
part through the effort of international institutions, and in part through
technological advances. It has created a world for international econom-
ics, whose task, "today . . . is largely a problem of 'managing' interde-
pendence." '76 What is to be managed? The "host of new problems"
brought about by the fact that "[w]hen economic transactions so easily
cross national borders, tensions occur merely because of the differences
69. Id. at 55.
70. Id. at 2.
71. Id. at 3.
72. Id. at 2.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 3.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 4.
686 [VOL. 10:2
POSTWAR LAW AND POLICY
between economic institutions as well as cultures." Management, for
the international economic law specialist, means addressing anxieties
about the foreign and bridging cultural differences in a key distinctly
different from that of national politics. Because of interdependence, na-
tional governments on their own simply become "frustrated" addressing
these new problems. 8
Nevertheless, governments "respond" in many ways.' Some of these
responses are legitimate policy options examined later in the book:
"creat[ing] an international regulatory system," and "develop[ing] internal
policies designed to enable their nations to better cope with the chal-
lenges of the world economy" which Jackson terms "industrial poli-
cies."' When responding in these ways, governments "confront interna-
tional as well as national sets of rules, procedures, and princi-
ples" 8"-the very same rules that were called forth by the imperatives
of an expanding international market's need for security, predictability,
and the like.
Sometimes, however, governments are tempted to disregard these rules
or to interpret them cynically, exploiting the "ease with which detailed
legal criteria can be overcome for political purposes."' This behavior
typifies a
larger dilemma... today: the tension that is created when legal rules,
designed to bring the subject a measure of predictability and stability, are
juxtaposed with the intense human needs of government to make "excep-
tions" to solve short-term or ad hoc problems. This tension poses difficult
problems for the practitioner and the scholar.
In short, when the issue is government's political resistance to the
interpenetration of national and international, scholars and practitioners
stand with the rules. When the issue is residual attachment to the partic-
ularity of law, the practitioner/scholar stands with the international,
where those sorts of distinctions no longer seem relevant.
Where Jackson's consideration of international trade law and institu-
tions is preoccupied with displacing law's specificity, his treatment of
national institutions in the following chapter is closely focused on the
77. Id.
78. Id. at 5.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 6.
83. Id.
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relationship between international and national. In a sense, Jackson pur-
sues the theme of his introduction, elaborating on the centrality of na-
tional institutions to the international trade system. He reasserts their
importance84 and introduces a number of significant national institu-
tions, beginning with the United States presidency and Congress. Indeed,
the chapter is significant in part because we can begin to see the out-
lines of the international trade regime's physical geography: Jackson
devotes sixteen pages to the United States, three and one-half pages to
the European Community, and one-half page to Japan.
More significant, however, is the role and nature of the national insti-
tutions Jackson outlines. The chapter opens with a short disquisition on
the nature of sovereignty:
The erosion of the concept of sovereignty in international affairs has been
much commented on. Perhaps in no context more than international eco-
nomic affairs has this erosion actually occurred.'
What Jackson describes is a matter of fact: sovereignty has been "erod-
ed," itself an interesting physical metaphor. The point is at once familiar
and puzzling. For a public international lawyer, such an observation
might well be followed by an analysis of the importance of international
norms and institutions, the history of their triumph, and a polemic for
their development. This is precisely the sort of history Jackson gives us
in introducing the erosion of law's specificity in the preceding chapter.
Here, by contrast, Jackson uses sovereignty's erosion to introduce the
importance of national institutions.
He dismisses the possibility that sovereignty might still be used to
"argue against either international rules or foreign government demands
for consultation or representation, on the basis that it 'interferes with our
sovereignty,' or that it encroaches on the 'internal affairs' of a given
government."'86 Given interdependence, this "is usually a misplaced ar-
gument in today's world.""7 At the same time, however, no "proposed
course of international action" is possible except through the "le-
84. Id. at 59 ("It is also clear today that any coordinated activity of govern-
ments, especially in connection with economic affairs, requires a complex set of indi-
vidual governmental actions by both international and national institutions.").
85. Id. Interestingly, Jackson cites only Wolfgang Friedmann's, The Changing
Structure of International Law-the 1964 high water mark of post-war liberalism in
American public international law, and square in the tradition of Kelsen's Holmes
Lectures-for this proposition.
86. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 6.
87. Id.
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gallconstitutional/political constraints" imposed by national "proce-
dures." In Jackson's world, the international has become substantive:
The national provides procedures for implementation.
The national works best as a mopping-up operation, attuned to the
needs and rules of the international regime, and deploying its institutions
in that context. But Jackson uses the section he labels "United States
Law and the International System-Synergy or Conflict"' to make a
broader point. It is not simply that, for example, "to achieve any mean-
ingful initiative... the GATT requires not only action by some body
of that organization, but also action by at least the United States and the
European Community-and probably also by Japan, Canada and certain
other key countries."
The erosion of sovereignty has also eliminated both the necessity and
the possibility of dealing with the United States or the European Com-
munity as units in favor of a dispersed set of institutions and actors,
both within and without the government 9 Indeed, the most significant
lesson of Jackson's chapter on national institutions is not that the nation-
al should be put at the disposal of the international trade regime, but
that a manager of the international trade regime, wherever he or she
works, internationally or nationally, must harness a wide variety of inter-
national, domestic, and foreign entities to get anything done? Jackson
goes on to present the significant institutional players and statutory re-
gimes in the United States, the European Community, and Japan.
Between this and the preceding chapters, we can see two quite differ-
ent roles for national actors: one, handmaiden to the trade regime (facili-
tator, translator, implementer); the other, an autonomous actor, resisting
the international. The first role, leading to synergy, is preferable, not
because it will promote free trade, but because it reflects a more accu-
rate understanding of the facts of contemporary international
life-interdependence brings with it a fragmented sovereign with many
players, which the sophisticated policy manager will understand as nu-
merous opportunities for engagement. This is a national unit to be wel-
comed into the international trade regime: indeed, we should insist upon
88. Id. at 60.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 59-60.
91. Id. at 77-78.
92. See, for example, Jackson's treatment of United States courts. executive, and
Congress and the European Community's "departure" from theories of "strict sover-
eignty" in following up the implementation of the Tokyo Round agreements in the
United States, id. at 197-99.
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it, refusing theoretical separations of the national and international. The
point of Jackson's meditation on sovereignty is to set the "facts" of
interdependence against the assertion of national autonomy where it
might threaten the international trade regime.
At the same time, there is another type of national behavior in which
the nation fancies itself autonomous, unitary, and sovereign, and operates
out of theory rather than practice. This outmoded role for the nation-
al-familiar from the introduction as the illegitimate attempt to swamp
law with politics-relies on the sort of autonomy for national institu-
tions, the sort of distinction between national and international, which
Jackson will not "indulge." 93
Thus, in considering the implementation of international economic
law, Jackson divides "opposition" to the effectiveness of international
rules into two categories, both rooted in national governments. Some
opposition "can be traced to . . .older concepts of national sovereign-
ty,' 94 which translates, for Jackson, into illegitimate self-dealing by na-
tional leaders:
The chance to go "tooting off in private jets to negotiate with other na-
tional leaders at comfortable locations or three-star restaurants" is a key
plum of otherwise dull government jobs, a high government ex-official
once indicated.95
But the "wise" national leader should also advocate breach of interna-
tional economic law obligations when the rule is "bad policy" or "out-
dated" or "when reform of the rule is badly needed."'96 In short, when
the national leader is the more appropriate agent for implementation of a
sound international economic policy.
We can begin to see here the complex geography of Jackson's inter-
national economic law. It is not simply radiation out from the United
States toward Europe and Japan, but involves activities on two conceptu-
al levels pursuing incompatible logics: a trade regime, associated with
the international and with law, but agnostic about their specificity; and a
lower level, associated with national institutions and politics when these
cannot be recruited into "synergy" with the international economic re-
gime and insist on making old-fashioned arguments about "sovereignty."
In the well-functioning trade regime, there is no particular role for clear-
93. Id. at 22.
94. Id. at 84.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 84-85.
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ly legal or international institutions. In an interdependent world, a vari-
ety of social forms and institutions can, as a matter of fact, be used in
managing commercial transactions. Law regains its specificity when
necessary to counterbalance national sovereign recidivism, cabining the
tendency of governments to stray from the range of acceptable responses
to the new interdependence.
For Jackson, an "interdependent" sovereignty involves a tension, pre-
sented as such, between the use or deployment of state institutions as an
instance in international economic regulation or management, and re-
moving the state as a political instance altogether. The tension could be
resolved, of course, and conflict could give way to synergy, if those in-
volved in the national systems would change their orientation from an
outmoded political nationalism to a broad, more sophisticated manage-
ment ethic. They should be moved to do so, Jackson suggests, for a
familiar reason: that is the direction in which history is moving.
Jackson's chapter on dispute resolution, which follows the chapters on
international and national institutions, takes up the effectiveness of the
international economic law system in classic terms. Jackson quotes a
lengthy passage "adapted from" two previous articles of his written in
the metropolitan tradition of legal process and transnationalism. We
find again the opposition between a "'power-oriented' technique" and a
"'rule-oriented' technique." Every "observable" international system
involves "some mixture of both," and both involve action by national
as well as international actors, public as well as private negotiations. In
the rule-oriented approach, however, all actors can participate democrati-
cally, having "their inputs" at various levels, and all can rely on "sta-
bility and predictability."'" The power-oriented technique, by contrast,
requires secrecy and executive discretion, hallmarks of a unitary and
undemocratic sovereignty. In the power-oriented technique, players'
"bargaining chips" are perceptions of relative authority rather than rule
interpretations, and the stronger will be at an advantage. In the rule-
oriented technique, raw power differentials are not crucial. Rather, they
97. Id. at 85-88 (adapting text from John H. Jackson, Crumbling Institutions of
the Liberal Trade System, 12 J. WORLD TRADE L. 93, 98-101 (1978) [hereinafter
Jackson, Crumbling Institutions]; John H. Jackson, Governmental Disputes in Interna-
tional Trade Relations: A Proposal in the Context of GAIT, 13 J. WORLD TRADE L
1, 3-4 (1979) [hereinafter Jackson, Governmental Disputes]).
98. Id. at 85.
99. Id. at 85-86.
100. Id. at 87-88 (quoting Jackson, Crumbling Institutions. supra note 97, at
98-101; Jackson, Governmental Disputes, supra note 97, at 3-4).
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are tempered by good faith, and by the fairness of the rules themselves.
The crucial point is again historical:
To a large degree, the history of civilization may be described as a grad-
ual evolution from a power-oriented approach, in the state of nature,
toward a rule-oriented approach ....
[A] particularly strong argument exists for pursuing gradually and
consistently the progress of international economic affairs toward a rule-
oriented approach.''
This historical narrative, bracketed in lengthy quotations from earlier
works, sits uneasily with Jackson's usual take-it-as-it-comes posture of
management realism. This chapter ends "looking at the future" of dis-
pute settlement and advocating work to improve the international dispute
settlement system for economic matters." In this sense, the chapter is
more aggressively situated in the development of the legal system than
the book as a whole, and certainly more so than the conclusion. Here,
Jackson advocates attention to the system, rather than resolution of any
particular dispute: "[I]t must be recognized that in most cases it is not
the resolution of the specific dispute under consideration which is more
important. Rather, it is the efficient and just future functioning of the
overall system which is the primary goal .... ""
As a consequence of Jackson's redefinition of the national state's
appropriate role, the system which Jackson promotes is no longer that of
public international law. In one sense, the state remains the defining unit
for international economic law, as it was for public international law. In-
deed, the "more restrained" definition for international economic law
Jackson proposes, involving transactions "that cross national borders"
and the "establishment on national territory of economic activity of
persons or firms originating from outside that territory,"'" is obviously
parasitical on the public international law scheme of territorial jurisdic-
tion. Here, however, the point is not to relate governments peacefully to
one another in a broader international public law regime, but to facilitate
"flows" across their boundaries by eliminating national governmental
interference.
The state's role is either passive, like a map, staying out of the way
as economic activity flows about, or facilitative, enlisted in the imple-
101. Id. at 86-87 (adapting from Jackson, Crumbling Institutions, supra note 112,
at 98-101; Jackson, Governmental Disputes, supra note 97, at 3-4).
102. Id. at 109.
103. Id. at 112.
104 Id. at 21.
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mentation of international objectives. In this, international economic law,
like public international law, insists on the obsolescence of sovereignty.
Only here, the sovereign has not been embroidered in a broader politics,
but has disintegrated into a broader economy. The international legal
system to be developed is moving, not toward centralization, but toward
fragmentation, as individuals at all levels become its agents in myriad
proliferating contexts and institutions. Jackson notes the increasing
"balkanization" of dispute resolution'0 and stresses the importance of
bilateral or "minilateral" negotiations" and "citizen initiative."'"
The result is again a regime divided into two zones: one of interna-
tional economic flows, and another of the underlying terrain of national
politics. The upper zone is sophisticated, rational, and humane; the lower
zone is murky, indulgent, physical, and frightening. In this, Jackson has
reversed his initial anxieties about interdependence. We are no longer
situated nationally, anxious about things foreign. We are now secure in
the cosmopolitan world of international economic law, and uneasy only
about the shady doings of an outmoded national politics.
It is a structure which Jackson naturalizes throughout the book with
metaphor, exactly as many public international lawyers naturalized their
policy proposal with the metaphor of an evolution from primitivism.
Here, however, the image is spatial-a "landscape"-rather than tempor-
al." The conclusion vividly presents the international trade regime,
not as an embryo about to be born, but as an anatomically detailed
body in space:
What we have explored in the preceding chapters can be characterized as
the "constitution" for international trade relations in the world today. It is
a very complex mix of economic and governmental policies, political con-
straints, and above all (from my perspective) an intricate set of constraints
imposed by a variety of "rules" or legal norms. It is these legal norms
which provide the skeleton for the whole system. Attached to that skele-
ton are the softer tissues of policy and administrative discretion. Even the
skeleton is not rigid or always successful in sustaining the weight placed
upon it. Some of the "bones" bend and crack from time to time. And
some of the tissues are unhealthy."°
105. Id. at 52.
106. Id. at 110-11.
107. Id. at 103-14.
108. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 1, at 28 (describing "landscape of international
economic institutions"); id. at 251 (referring to "landscape of national and internation-
al rules").
109. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 299.
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The body is fragile, the prognosis uncertain. No one can say "for cer-
tain" that "worldwide economic disaster" can be avoided." ' Indeed,
Jackson, like Kelsen, is adept at wrapping his polemics in apocalyptic
invocations, such as "[o]ne can only hope that mistakes of the 1920s
and 1930s can be avoided.""' Jackson ends the book with the hope
that the body will experience the "predictability and stability needed not
only for solid economic progress, but also for the flexibility necessary to
avoid floundering on the shoals of parochial special national inter-
ests."' 12
The metaphoric change suggests the difference between Jackson and
public international lawyers like Hans Kelsen as polemicists. Kelsen's
metaphor was temporal, naturalizing his advocacy of a new international
regime as evolution, and the public international lawyer has, in many
ways remained frozen in the becoming of that regime. Jackson's spatial
metaphor welcomes the neophyte into the natural architecture of an ex-
isting regime. Jackson's objective is not to further progress toward a
new regime, but to improve management of the "world trading system."
It is the "economic diplomats" who, in Jackson's final sentence, "we"
hope will steer international economic law clear of the shoals of "paro-
chial special national interests.""' 3 In the only passage in the book ad-
dressing the reader as a "you," Jackson suggests who these economic
diplomats might be. In the very first sentences of the book, Jackson
presents "puzzles" which call for thought experiments: "Suppose you are
the minister for trade of a small Asian country that is rapidly develop-
ing," and "[s]uppose you are advising a large multinational corporation
based in the United States.""' 4 The reader is not asked to play the role
of an "economist" or "expert,''15 but of a policy maker outside the
explicitly international institutional structure. Public international law
texts are always asking us to imagine ourselves working for the State
Department, the United Nations, or as citizens engaging in civil disobe-
dience or working for non-governmental advocacy groups, struggling to
build a new international society. Jackson has us working for companies,
law firms, and governments, all representing clients with economic inter-
ests.
110. Id. at 308.
111. Id. at 187.
112. Id. at 308.
113. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 308.
114. Id. at 1.
115. Cf. id. at 2 (noting puzzle not solvable by any one academic discipline).
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We can now begin to make out Jackson's own charge to the policy
establishment: to beat their plowshares into r6sum6s. Jackson's is a call
to work rather than to public participation. It is a call to work not with
a personal commitment to renewal of the international order, but with a
day-to-day creativity in the exploitation of opportunities for wise action
within the international trade system. Jackson addresses not a citizen in-
telligentsia concerned about peace, but students interested in careers in
international economic law. In this sense, Jackson is an American pro-
fessor of international law.
III. THE SUBSTANTIVE CHAPTERS: A COSMOPOLITAN
ARCHITECTURE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
The bulk of Jackson's book takes up the substantive structure of the
international economic law regime. Four chapters consider the most
significant regulatory principles governing the normal trade situation:
tariff reduction, most-favored-nation status, non-discrimination, and per-
missible safeguards and adjustment mechanisms." 6 Three chapters con-
sider more abnormal or exceptional situations: national policies which
might legitimately "compete" with a free trade orientation, and responses
to "unfair" trading practices like dumping and subsidies."' Two chap-
ters take up "economies that do not well fit the roles of the world trad-
ing system": developing economies and state traders."8
In their overall pragmatism, these chapters confirm Jackson's public
international law lineage. Jackson builds upon the elements of interna-
tional policy pragmatism: a proliferation of contexts and players, an
admixture of law and politics, a rejection of fetishism about sovereignty,
a modesty about reform, an evolutionary progressive faith, a skepticism
of grand theoretical claims or plans, a practical orientation, and a case-
by-case approach. Bargaining occurs over the meaning or range of legal
and political solutions, as well as over their content." 9
We are far from formalism. All the key terms- "subsidy," "tariff,"
even "product," "industry," and "causation"--are presented as ambigu-
ous." Although meanings will be open to negotiation, even the basic
116. Id. chs. 5-8.
117. Id. chs. 9-11.
118. Id. chs. 12-13.
119. In discussing the myriad specific tariff "bindings" or "concessions" which
make up the bulk of the GATI rule system, for example. Jackson stresses the bar-
gained, potentially reciprocal, dimension of both political exceptions and legal commit-
ments. Id. at 118-26.
120. See especially his discussion of GAIT Article XIX, id. at 156, 159-60. intro-
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bargaining concepts are ambiguous. We cannot be sure what a "recipro-
cal" deal might be, nor whether a nation has bargained for an "advan-
tage."'' Indeed, people often call their actions "concessions" when
these actions should be seen as having been to their advantage and vice
versa. Even the basic policy arguments and legal interpretations, which
might be helpful in sorting out whether a deal was reciprocal or whether
an advantage was obtained, are insufficiently precise. Legal interpreta-
tions and policies inevitably conflict,' and the policy scientist cannot
say which interpretation is right."
Throughout the book, dozens of terms-some technical, others collo-
quial-are "placed" in quotations, not to ground the term in authority
(Jackson is not quoting anyone in particular), but to signal his distance
from any formal or essential approach to the language of international
economic policy. Everything is a term of art, as if the modifier "so-
called" were placed before every noun, Jackson sharing with the reader
a sophisticated appreciation for the ambiguity of all terms of art. The
only people who appear in the text as authorities to stabilize this in-
terpretive ambiguity are unnamed policy managers-a "European diplo-
mat" or a "senior GAT official" who provide aphorisms and anecdotes.
The ground is a cosmopolitan present, peopled by roles. Jackson cabins
the policy process only with a hope and an apocalyptic invocation
should we lose our orientation.'24
Jackson's departure from the sensibility of public international law is
as stark as the continuity of his pragmatism. He transforms the possi-
bility, direction, and politics of public policy, both nationally and inter-
nationally. Jackson puts in question the entire notion of a peculiarly
international order-indeed of a juridically structured order at all. Jack-
son fragments both the subjects and arena of international order, envi-
sioning a shifting process of bargaining, at once legal and political. He
reorients us away from the level at which the economic law regime
operates and toward its substantive spirit and policy orientation."
From this vantage point, he offers the policy scientist a substantially
narrowed vision of the possibilities for national public policy and a
ducing the idea of "variable" concepts.
121. See id. ch. 5.
122. Id. at 170-72.
123. Id. at 172.
124. See, e.g., id. at 187.
125. For a comparable deconstructive move in public international law see Philip
Allott, Power Sharing In The Law of the Sea, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 5-6 (1983).
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transformation of international public policy from the sphere of politics
to that of technical expertise. The result is an international economic
law regime with a completely different geography from that of earlier
internationalist dreams.
We should take the elements of this dramatic reorientation, this move
from metropolitan to cosmopolitan, one at a time. Jackson's broad rear-
rangement of both the players and the field of international order, to
focus on spirit rather than structure, is evident in the general framework
and role he gives to international economic law and in his chapter seven
treatment of safeguards.'" The consequent narrowing of national public
policy is well-illustrated both by chapter seven and by chapter nine,
which concerns national policies which "compete" with liberal trade
objectives. 7 Chapters ten (on anti-dumping rules)" and eleven (on
subsidies)," which together address what are often thought "unfair"
trading practices, give a sense of the difficulties of mounting an inter-
national public policy to replace what has been lost at the national level.
Jackson presents the managed reduction of barriers to trade as the
core problem of international economic law.'" The book is concerned
with an idealized world of governmental behavior in which the key
actors are the policy makers of the national and international regimes.
The basic activity is the levying of tariffs and their removal or reduc-
tion. Governments set tariffs, disrupting the flow of trade, and the inter-
national economic regime tries to reduce or eliminate the disruption
through law, politics, bargaining, or adjudication, initiated either private-
ly or publicly.
It is important to remember that this idealized structure of national
regulation is all background to an idealized vision of normal trade
among private traders. In this market foreground, presumptively private
players are continuously bargaining and dealing, reaching out to one
another across an abyss of uncertainty to engage in commercial
transactions on the basis of a stable currency. In this book, Jackson tells
us very little about the legal or political basis for this activity. There is
nothing, for example, about the law of international commercial con-
tracts.13' He does, however, tell us two crucial things. First, given the
126. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 149-88.
127. Id. at 203-16.
128. Id. at 217-48.
129. Id. at 249-74.
130. Id. at 149.
131. For a fuller treatment of these matters, see JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 2,
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number of practical departures and exceptions, the focus on the indus-
trial trade in goods, imagined as an activity of private traders, may be
as much the exception as the rule.'32 Second, the international econom-
ic regime handles this problem by assimilating these exceptions as far as
possible to the core image of an arm's-length private transaction through
the use of analogy.
In this, international economic law facilitates the risk-taking behavior
of private traders by modeling it: developing international rules about
contracts and private property, and policies of privatization and currency
stabilization to serve the imagined needs and interests of "normal" pri-
vate traders. Where trade and traders are not "normal," the policy scien-
tist can devise exceptional and temporary adjustment policies by analo-
gy, treating the state trader's exports for dumping purposes, for example,
on the basis of a constructed cost.'33
This basic approach is important because international economic law
takes the same attitude, imagining all governmental activity as either a
barrier or a spur to trade. The image of nations assessing and reducing
tariffs is the basic conception. Other governmental activity is considered
against this image and is taken up in the order of our relative ability to
analogize a given activity to this structure. Thus, we move from tariffs
to quantitative restrictions (which are elaborately demonstrated to be
equivalent to tariffs), to subsidies, and then to other "nontariff barriers."
Jackson describes the landscape: "The receding waters of tariff and
other overt protection inevitably uncover the rocks and shoals of
nontariff barriers and other problems.""' As it turns out, the range of
governmental activities which can be analogized to the tariff, like the
number of human social activities which can be reimagined as bargained
exchanges among separate private actors, seems limited only by the
imagination.
One consequence is that the stringency of the policy system, the
intensity of the bargaining, the strength of the rules, and the overall
clarity of the policy choices, relax as we move outward from the core
of tariff reduction, just as the precision of the private trading system
erodes as we move toward trade in services, bartered exchanges, transfer
ch. 2.
132. See id. at 139-40 (stating that industrial trade in goods accounts for only
fraction of actual world trade; percentage would, of course, be even less if transfer
priced trade within enterprises and bartered exchanges were considered).
133. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 221-22.
134. Id. at 4.
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pricing, and government procurement. In the case of private contracts,
we usually react to this erosion with some alarm, even moral indigna-
tion, and a call for the restructuring of what could seem corrupt insider
deals into arm's-length transactions so as to narrow the gap between law
and society. In the case of government regulation, however, we have an
altogether different reaction. Particularly if we have a background in
public international law, we might anticipate that as the analogy neces-
sary to see national governmental activity as a barrier to trade becomes
attenuated, the legitimacy of international intervention will fade. We will
enter what a public international lawyer might call the zone of "exclu-
sive domestic jurisdiction" or "sovereignty."
The interesting point is that Jackson reacts to this inevitable erosion
of the model of tariffs as we might to the erosion of contract. We re-
member that for Jackson, arguments about "sovereignty" are no longer
meaningful in an interdependent world. Consequently, as the analogy
weakens, and as the international policy machinery becomes both more
complex and less effective, governments are, Jackson asserts, more able
to hide their parochialism, more likely to manipulate the rules, and more
ingenious in their efforts to thwart free-trade objectives. As it becomes
conceptually more difficult to see governmental action as a quantifiable
barrier to trade, Jackson presents the national authorities as increasingly
sneaky and cynical in pursuit of their parochial aims." Actually, Jack-
son suggests, there is no limit to the ingenuity with which governments
can invent ways to get around their basic obligations and reintroduce (in
the form of non-tariff barriers)'" barriers to trade previously eliminated
by tariff concessions. It is like evading the income tax.'"
Were they upfront about it, governments would be as open to good-
faith bargaining or reciprocal concessions in the area of non-tariff barri-
ers as they are about tariffs. The process of international economic
bargaining can deal easily with tariffs and relatively easily with quotas,
but things become more difficult for subsidies and practically impossible
for other non-tariff barriers. When it comes to non-tariff barriers, rather
than trying to define a level of national governmental activity as off
limits to the international regulator, Jackson focuses on the need for a
135. Id. at 129-31. It is no wonder that in the recent GAT" round, negotiators
have pressed the "principle" of "tariffication without exception" to force conversion of
all trade restrictions into tariffs. Francis Williams, Uruguay Deadline Seen as Last
Chance, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1993, at 8.
136. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 130.
137. Id.
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change in spirit at the national level: the enlistment of national policy
managers to the broader goals of liberal trade. 3
Ultimately, this change in spirit is far more important than a rear-
rangement of jurisdictions or the development of a particular internation-
al institutional apparatus. Indeed, Jackson is no knee-jerk supporter of
either the international or the multilateral. In discussing the most-fa-
vored-nation obligation and "its politics," for example, Jackson describes
a policy both legal and non-legal, to be carried out both multilaterally
and bilaterally. Because the multilateral process seems to have gotten
stuck, Jackson supports bilateral moves to stimulate trade-so long as
the policy experts at the national level operate in the right spirit.'39
For Jackson, the goal is no longer rearranging sovereigns into an
international legal order. Policy might be bilateral or multilateral, formu-
lated by governments or private parties, internationally or nationally. The
issue is the spirit with which policy is devised-whether it advances the
project of international economic law.'" This shift away from a coher-
ent and progressively developing international regime of delineated com-
petencies toward a more fluid network of shifting bargains, united only
by an orientation toward liberal trade, defines Jackson's cosmopolitan
vision most cleanly.
Throughout the book, Jackson gives short pragmatic sermons about
the constant temptation, and, consequently, the enduring reality of offi-
cial cynicism and manipulation, inevitably shading off into a parochial
politics. 4' His proposal is to bring these activities to light, placing all
such temptations in a general process of mutual awareness and bargain-
ing, in the hope that, like tariffs, they will be reduced by mutual con-
cession. Given the strength of the temptations, and the meager and am-
biguous conceptual framework for such a discussion, he is inevitably
modest in his expectations. Indeed, we can really only hope that gov-
ernments will take their cue from the international policy scientist and
become more responsible. It is at this point that Jackson invokes a cata-
strophic image of autarchy and war to kick-start the reorientation of
spirit he thinks necessary.
Transparency-the transformation of hidden governmental policies into
138. Id. at 123-26.
139. See id. at 145-48.
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., id. at 135 (discussing preferential systems in relation to most-fa-
vored-nation status); id. at 149-53 (identifying arguments for safeguards measures); id.
at 165 (discussing Article 19 obligations).
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quantifiable trade restraints which might then be the object of bargain-
ing--creates what might be thought of as a market for policy. The dan-
ger, of course, is that this process of reinterpretation will be taken too
far, disrupting even the settled norms of private law which facilitate
commerce by seeing them as political choices. This danger is often
thought of as the threat posed to national "culture" by international
technocratic governance, a danger inherent in broad scale trade talks
such as America's Structural Impediments Initiative with Japan. Here,
the cosmopolitan leaves us only with caution and recognition of the
importance of differences in generating trade through comparative advan-
tage. There can be no sure line between national regulation which
should be foresworn, harmonized, or bargained, and the more apolitical
background norms and cultural differences which are to be left intact,
any more than there can be a clear line between public and private in a
post-sovereign world. For Jackson, a reciprocal national vigilance about
what seems foreign "unfairness," moderated by awareness of the irreduc-
ibility of differences among national economic cultures, provides a sort
of interface between necessarily different national regulatory systems.
This approach is apparent in his presentation of national "safeguards"
and "adjustments."' 42 It is perfectly legitimate for nations to help their
societies adjust to an open-trade regime. As trade barriers fall, Article
XIX of the GATI permits restrictions, and when justified, these are
what we might term "industrial policy."'43 Jackson warns, however,
that these "economic adjustment" goals are almost always enmeshed in
"practical politics.'" Indeed, the ambiguity of the concepts involved
makes it practically impossible to tell where adjustment ends and pro-
tection begins and makes all legal and policy regimes attempting to
demarcate legitimate and illegitimate safeguard activity complex and
uncertain. In the end, Jackson suggests, there simply is no practical way
either finally to prohibit or permit safeguards and adjustment policies at
the national level."4s It will be a matter of individual choice and orien-
tation.
For Jackson, the way out is not to propose any single institutional or
legal solution for which right-thinking policy managers will be recruited,
but to place safeguard policies, in the broadest sense, among the decen-
tralized bargaining chips in international economic negotiation, like
142. See id. at 149-57.
143. Id. at 151-58.
144. Id. at 149.
145. Id. at 184-87.
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tariffs. 4 This avoids the pretense of a legal solution, but sets in mo-
tion a process that avoids excessively prolonged adjustments or protec-
tion masquerading as industrial policy. In the end, he asserts,
[i]t is difficult at this juncture to evaluate the potential for progress on
safeguards discipline in the near future. Nevertheless, it does appear that
the lack of substantial progress on this matter poses risks in an increas-
ingly interdependent world. One can only hope that mistakes of the 1920s
and 1930s can be avoided.147
That the matter had been one of spirit rather than structure was evident
in his introduction of the topic:
If there were no "liberal trade" policy or practice, we would not need to
consider safeguards as such. It is only because international economic
policies have emphasized reduction of border barriers to trade that the
subject of safeguards, as an exception to the general rule of liberal-trade
opportunities, comes into play. '"
It would be easy to miss the significance of this approach and to
underestimate its difference from the contemporary public law pragma-
tism of the "international legal process" and "transnational" schools who
inherited public international law's pragmatism. Like them, Jackson
analogizes many different types of activities to pronouncements of the
sovereign. Like them, he transforms an ambiguous set of policy and
legal interpretive choices into an ongoing decentralized process of bar-
gaining and mutual accommodation. Jackson's suggestion that national
particularist activities come out as formally visible barriers to trade in a
decentralized international bargaining process 49 resembles the efforts of
public international lawyers to see any contact between people of differ-
ent nationalities as the international public order at work. But Jackson
does not drift toward national or private law. On the contrary, in his
vision, the domestic policy manager has been reinvigorated by an inter-
nationalist spirit.
Unlike these public law scholars, however, Jackson does not present
his bargaining process as a regime, nor his free-trade orientation as an
international public policy choice to be implemented by an international
policy apparatus, however decentralized. He does not accompany his
criticism of national particularism with advocacy of a broader interna-
146. Id.
147. Id. at 187.
148. Id. at 149.
149. Id. at 149-53.
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tional regime. He does not imagine that good international rules might
reduce the conceptual difficulties obscuring the legal distinction between
legitimate and illegitimate national action. In fact, his view is quite the
opposite.
Jackson presents national policy either as already part of international
economic law (because, as a matter of fact, it facilitates international
economic activity) or as an unfortunate deviation. In Jackson's view, the
choice is not between those areas of national public life which are part
of "domestic jurisdiction" and those which have come to be regulated
internationally, but between areas that do and do not support liberal
trade. The public international mind searches for a way to understand
this shift. It only seems possible within an invigorated monism, in
which all of national policy has become subject to the international pub-
lic policy of trade liberalization, enforced, however imperfectly, by the
GATT and the primitively decentralized institutions of the international
public regime. Again, nothing could be further from Jackson's concep-
tion. International policy is simply absent from his system, other than as
the working out of reciprocal self-restaint.
This approach to national public policy is most evident in chapter
nine, which explicitly considers national policies which "compete" with
liberal trade objectives. 5' Jackson identifies two "threads" that run
through the chapter "the existence of important policies competing with
those of comparative advantage and liberal trade, and the desirability of
protecting the value of tariff and other trade rules by plugging
'loopholes' and preventing the protectionist use of a variety of ingenious
import restraints. '"' The core opposition is familiar-national policies
which promote liberal trade and the ingenious exploitation of so-called
loopholes for parochial objectives. This chapter considers situations
which depart from that general structure, "in which import-restraining
activity is required by legitimate government goals."'I
These situations turn out to be few in number and hard to specify.
The most obvious case is "national security," and Jackson quickly recog-
nizes that "the competing policy of protecting a nation's continued exis-
tence is obviously more important than economic welfare or other poten-
tial benefits of comparative advantage."'5 It turns out, however, that
150. Id. at 201-16.
151. Id. at 203.
152. Id.
153. Id. It is interesting that the "benefits of comparative advantage," introduced
quite modestly, appear here as a sizeable and concrete factual matter to be weighed
19951 703
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
policy makers are often mistaken in developing national security poli-
cies. For example, "[i]n a world where some wars could be over in
minutes, traditional notions of the need for production facilities are not
always applicable.' ' 1 4 Indeed, the aggressive pursuit of comparative
advantage may itself maximize security. Import restrictions may blunt
national research and technical proficiency, or encourage national de-
fense industries to go soft in the absence of vigorous competition.
The main point, however, is that the GATT language allowing na-
tional security exceptions is so broad, self-judging, and ambiguous that
it obviously can be abused. "It has even been claimed that maintenance
of shoe production facilities qualify for the exception because an army
must have shoes!"'
55
This problem becomes even more grave when we come to the "gen-
eral exceptions for health and welfare."'' 6 Jackson lists the exceptions
of GAIT Article XX, 57 and indicates that "[m]ost of these measures
might be thought of as falling within the general 'police powers' or
'health and welfare powers' of a government."'58 Again the crucial
point is that "[m]any of these exceptions are quite general; for example,
'public morals' or 'human health.' Obviously, clever argumentation
could be used to justify practices which have as their secret goal pre-
venting import competition." ' 9
Again, the difficulty is that it will be impossible to tell in any clear
way where legitimate objectives shade off into the illegitimate. Jackson
works through a number of examples which demonstrate that even ap-
parently legitimate efforts to prevent pollution or promote worker safety
can wreak havoc with the trade system." From a logical point of
view, he acknowledges, it is perfectly possible to argue that products
produced under less stringent national labor, safety, pollution, or health
against national existence. Id.
154. Id. at 203-04.
155. Id. at 204.
156. Id. at 206-08.
157. Id. at 206. He lists public morals, protection of human, animal or plant life
or health, gold or silver trade, customs enforcement, monopoly laws (antitrust), pat-
ents, trademarks, copyrights, preventing deceptive practices, banning products of prison
labor, protecting national treasures, conserving natural resources, carrying out an ap-
proved commodity agreement, export restrictions to implement a price stabilization
program. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 207.
160. Id. at 208-10.
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regulations ought not be imported. Consequently,
[i]t is an issue fraught with dangerous potential. If this principle were ex-
tended... it could be the basis of a rash of import restrictions, often de-
feating the basic goals of comparative advantage. Government regulations
vary so greatly that the already difficult conceptual questions of the
world's rules on subsidies would pale into insignificance beside the prob-
lems which the cost of regulation equalization would create.'
The solution is neither an international regime nor recognition of a
sphere of domestic jurisdiction. Instead, Jackson urges us to move in
two familiar directions. First, toward vigilance against the abusive de-
ployment of these exceptions, and second, toward "'benign neglect' with
the possibility that over time mahy of these problems will sort them-
selves out as the necessity of health and safety regulation becomes more
apparent to more nations."'" As policy managers, we must preserve in
the first instance our free-trade orientation, avoiding the temptation to-
ward national parochialism. Rather than being recruited to build an
international regime, we are left hoping that enlightenment will bring
regulatory harmonization, eliminating the temptation to use these excep-
tions and the need for more aggressive international enforcement.
There remains one sort of national policy which should be vigorously
pursued to prevent private parties from erecting barriers to trade com-
mensurate with the governmental restrictions so laboriously dismantled:
antitrust laws." Jackson unleashes national governments not where
their own existence is at stake, but where they might contribute to the
effort to remove barriers to trade by focusing on the private barriers
they seem most suited to police. The only proviso is that nations not
use their antitrust policies to implement "buy domestic" attitudes. Even
here, Jackson hesitates to advocate substituting an international for a
national regime.'" Voluntary codes may be as good as mandatory
ones, and national enforcement better or worse than international en-
forcement. The crucial point is that trade barriers must be reduced.
The public international lawyer may have difficulty making sense of
Jackson's approach. If a public international lawyer wanted to move the
international system toward more liberal trade, he would seek to limit
governmental actions which obstructed this goal. He would rely on the
161. Id. at 210.
162. Id.
163. See id at 211-13.
164. Id. at 212-13.
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decentralized mechanisms of the international regime, and enhance both
the strength of that regime and its commitment to free trade, perhaps
through new treaties, institutions, and court decisions. Indeed, it is
tempting to understand the GATT system in just these terms.
By contrast, Jackson begins with the persuasiveness to policy makers
of liberal trade arguments, and analyzes the policy dilemmas which
result. 65 National governments are, and will be, oriented toward free
trade. In public-international-law speak, they are already the primitive
decentralized agents of an international free-trade public policy. Where
they can do more, they should and will. When it comes to an interna-
tional regime, Jackson counsels "benign neglect."'" His concern is
with the quite serious conceptual difficulties-the indeterminacies of
rules and standards--one encounters in trying to legislate what is and
what is not a barrier to trade or a legitimate national exception. Only
vigilance toward devious motives at all levels can answer this threat.
In chapters ten and eleven, Jackson comes closest to considering the
possibility of an international public policy which, from a public interna-
tional lawyer's perspective, could guarantee limits on national trade
policies or replace the prerogatives sacrificed by national sovereigns to
free trade.'67 Both chapters take up the distinction in the liberal-trade
regime between "fair" and "unfair" trade practices. Chapter ten considers
national regimes' responses to "dumping" by foreign competitors."
Chapter eleven considers national export "subsidies."'" These chapters
illustrate two related approaches to what we might think of as interna-
tional public policy.
Jackson begins by placing the terms "fair" and "unfair" quite firmly
in quotation marks, stating that "[t]he distinction between fair and unfair
trade has become increasingly blurred in recent years, partly because of
some fundamental disagreement about what should be called unfair."'7
People use the terms in a variety of shifting and vague ways. More
importantly, however, conflicts about the meaning of fairness reflect
unbridgeable cultural differences: "Societies and their economic systems
differ so dramatically that what seems unfair to members of one society
165. Id. at 203-13.
166. Id. at 210.
167. See id. at 217-74.
168. See id. at 217-48.
169. See id. at 249-74.
170. Id. at 217.
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may seem perfectly fair to those of another society.""'
As public international lawyers, we are immediately drawn to the
possibilities for international negotiation, consensus building, treaty draft-
ing, adjudicating, harmonizing, carving out spheres of cultural difference
to be respected, and realizing predictably stable international terms for
trade. We might even expect Jackson, a well-known proponent of free
trade, to begin such an international exercise by treating as unfair those
policies which distort free trade. This, however, is not Jackson's ap-
proach.
Instead, Jackson warns us that "trading practices that.., have been
considered unfair because they interfere with or distort free-market-econ-
omy principles" are equally difficult to specify." The problem is the
irreducible differences among economies.
[E]ven among the relatively similar western industrial-market economies,
there are wide differences to do with the degree of government involve-
ment in economy, in the forms of regulation or ownership of various
industrial or other economic segments. As world economic interdepen-
dence has increased, it has become more difficult to manage relationships
among various economies."
Even slight differences in "acceptance of basic free-market economy
principles" can result in "situations that are considered unfair, even
though these differences may not have resulted from any consciously
unfair policies or practices." 74
When presented with the difficulty of interpreting liberal trade princi-
ples in national situations, Jackson responds with a call to vigilance
against national tendencies to deviate, hiding their parochialism under
manipulations of terms like "barrier to trade." When presented with the
ambiguities of an international regulatory term like "fairness," Jackson
responds by validating the diversity of national interpretations. Indeed,
an international goal to achieve a "level playing field" might "imply that
all governments must adopt uniform policies.""' Even economic theory
stands against such a result, as comparative economic advantage depends
precisely on the continued existence of cultural differences. "Besides,"
Jackson asks, "isn't trade to some degree based on differences between
171. Id. at 218.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 219.
175. Id. at 218.
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countries . . . ?176
For Jackson, the difficulty here is
analogous to the difficulties involved in trying to get two computers of
different designs to work together. To do so, one needs an interface
mechanism to mediate between the two computers. Likewise, in interna-
tional economic relations, particularly in trade relations, some "interface
mechanism" may be necessary to allow different economic systems to
trade together harmoniously.'"
This "interface" concept is perhaps the book's most significant and
original contribution. It reappears at several points and expresses ex-
tremely well a central theme of Jackson's approach to international
public policy. The international regime, to the extent it must exist,
should be quasi-mechanical and facilitative, focusing on communication
and correspondence between systems rather than on the construction of a
new international legal order or system. The best we can do is to make
assumptions and approaches visible, and hope for their bargained ame-
lioration as the liberal-trade spirit becomes more widespread.
Jackson illustrates this approach in his discussion of national anti-
dumping regimes.' Jackson, like many other international economic
law specialists, is quite skeptical of anti-dumping statutes. It is difficult,
as an economic matter, to see what is wrong with discriminatory pric-
ing, except perhaps in limited cases of predatory behavior. Even then, it
appears a nation's consumers would have more to gain than its produc-
ers would have to lose. At best, it is difficult to measure dumping with
any precision, and national administration of anti-dumping regimes,
triggered by national producers' complaints, are likely to provide an am-
ple wardrobe for dressing up protectionist measures in the rhetoric of
fairness. At worst, anti-dumping can perpetuate "medieval notions of
'fair price."" 79 As with national policies which might be exceptions to
free trade, the case for anti-dumping legislation is clearest when it tracks
antitrust concerns most closely, enforcing rather than disturbing the
liberal trade system.'
Nevertheless, for all this skepticism, Jackson advocates neither an
international dumping regime restricted to antitrust concerns nor a man-
dated dismantling of national regimes.'8 ' He describes ways in which a
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 221-47.
179. Id. at 223.
180. See id. at 223-25.
181. Compare Jackson's follower Denton on this point. Ross Denton, (Why) Should
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national anti-dumping system can be managed without using it as a
means of disguised protection through, for example, stringent injury and
causation requirements. Conceptual and legal tools are not available to
mandate this, but vigilance by policy managers can help resist the temp-
tation toward disguised protectionism.
Jackson concludes by proposing that we think of anti-dumping rules
as an "interface" mechanism through which differing national concep-
tions of fairness will be brought visibly into relationship with one anoth-
er." He suggests that the rules might be tested against the imperatives
of trade liberalization and be the subject of a shifting negotiation pro-
cess, which will be legal and political, national and international, private
and governmental. Jackson writes:
Finally, it is both interesting and potentially provocative to suggest the
possibility that for all its faults, the system of antidumping rules may be
performing a useful function in world trade, not as a response to so-called
unfairness, but rather as an "interface" or buffer mechanism to ameliorate
difficulties .. caused by interdependence among different economic sys-
tems. Could it be that the antidumping rules are acting as a crude or
blunt instrument to cause different economic systems to more equitably
share the burdens of adjusting to shifts of world trade flow? If so, per-
haps we should view antidumping rules as part of the subject of "safe-
guards" (described in chapter 7) rather than as part of a subject of "unfair
trade." 83
In this conception, the element of "unfairness," which might have
been the key to an international regime, has been eliminated. In fact,
"[s]ome of the 'unfairness' problems are in reality 'difference' prob-
lems.""' Anti-dumping regimes are reconceptualized as decentralized
mechanisms to facilitate trade liberalization. This happens either directly
in cases of antitrust violation, or indirectly, through mechanisms render-
ing visible the protectionist sentiment that springs naturally from cultural
differences. Such a protectionist sentiment might be reduced by policy
managers bargaining in the spirit of free trade.
If we are to think of this as an international public policy regime, it
is a very odd one indeed. There is no delimited role for the national
state, nor for any structured international legal process. Rather, we have
Nations Utilize Antidumping Measures?, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 224, 265-71 (1989)
(urging public interest analysis when enforcing anti-dumping laws).
182. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 244.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 26.
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a naturally occurring adjustment process operated by agents of liberal
trade sentiment throughout the existing institutional and legal system.
The regime follows free trade-not promoting it, but assisting it, mop-
ping up, and adjusting-less the idea of a regime than the regime of an
idea.
Chapter eleven, concerning subsidies, presents a comparable image of
the possibility of international public policy.s The visibility of subsi-
dy policies and their root in government, rather than private initiative,
makes this the most fruitful of various "unfair" trading practices around
which to develop an international regime.
[B]y way of contrast with dumping matters, in the case of subsidies we
are almost always talking about government action, rather than to indi-
vidual enterprise action. Thus, issues of subsidies and countervailing du-
ties are often significantly more visible and involve a higher level of gov-
ernment-to-government diplomacy than do many other trade policy mat-
ters.'
It also seems an appropriate area for international regulation since the
strongest economic argument for subsidy reduction is at the aggregate,
international level, rather than from the perspective of importing nations,
wfhich might well benefit from a foreign export subsidy.'
Nevertheless, Jackson does not advocate a public international law-
style regime to address the distortions which subsidies might bring to
liberal trade. He is critical of the existing international regime for at-
tempting to do too much with normative concepts far too indeterminate
to provide much guidance.' The existing system lacks even a defini-
tion of "subsidy," and therefore allows national regimes to give free
reign to their protectionist impulses in managing countervailing duty
mechanisms. 9
Jackson repeatedly emphasizes the "controversy," "perplexity," "confu-
sion," and "ambiguity" which plague the subject. Are subsidies "unfair"?
Do they damage anyone but the country which awards them? Should
trading partners respond with outrage or with a thank-you note? Can
subsidies be distinguished from all other national government activity? Is
every government policy not likely to reward some producers and shift
the costs of participating in trade? Can "export" subsidies be distin-
185. See id. at 249-73.
186. Id. at 250.
187. Id. at 252.
188. Id. at 255-61.
189. See id. at 257-58.
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guished from "general" subsidies with any precision?
In fact, the international subsidies regime itself may be as dangerous
as the practice of subsidization.
[I]t may be seen that the whole area of subsidies activity in international
law, including the rules designed to constrain the use of subsidies and the
other rules designed to allow national governments the unilateral privilege
of responding to subsides with countervailing duties, is not only extremely
complex but holds the potential, if misapplied, of undermining the basic
policy goals of the post-World War II liberal trade system',
The problem arises because "governments can use subsidies to evade a
liberal trade system" while at the same time "the unilateral national gov-
ernment response of countervailing duties, can be implemented in such a
way as to undermine liberal trade policies."'' In the context of nation-
al temptation to misuse controversial and ambivalent international rules,
the prospects for an international regime are meager indeed..
The reader may now detect that there is great controversy about economic
policies with respect to subsidies in international trade. It is not possible
at this point in time, nor in this book, to resolve these issues. One thing
is clear: for more than a century, the international trade rules, and some
national systems, have been established on the basis of the proposition
that imports which are subsidized by foreign governments are somehow
,'unfair."192
Again Jackson builds from fact subsidies are thought unfair, even if
there is no good reason for thinking so or no clear way of ascertaining
when. As a result, he proposes that international policy makers focus
quite narrowly on an "actionable subsidy," which would make the most
specific and trade distorting subsidies visible subjects of international de-
bate. 3 He does not propose a new international regime, which could
easily become the object of manipulation. Instead, he suggests "a series
of principles that could be entertained by negotiators or national policy
leaders in connection with the further elaboration of the international
subsidy rules."'94 Rather than a regime, we get guidance in right-think-
ing. Each principle seems aimed at limiting attention to the most visible
and formally identifiable subsidies, narrowing the ambit of attempted
190. Id. at 269.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 254.
193. See id. at 262-69.
194. Id. at 270.
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policy initiatives both internationally and nationally which might backfire
against the liberal-trade order.' For the rest, we return to benign ne-
glect, relying on the advancing spirit of trade liberalization.
IV. A COSMOPOLITAN GEOGRAPHY: INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM
The trading system Jackson describes, the "trade constitution" of
which he imaginatively projects, is universal in both aspiration and fact:
a "world" trading system, to which the widest variety of economies and
national regimes are assimilated. From a metropolitan point of view,
Jackson's focus on the United States, the European Community, and
Japan suggests a world radiating out from a center toward a periphery.
For Jackson, it is far more significant that the trade constitution has
room even for "economies that do not fit the rules of the world trading
system," including both the less developed and those with nonmarket
economies.
Jackson's international spirit is, in this sense, liberal and ecumenical.
In considering "state trading and nonmarket economies," he observes
that although "the post World War II international trading system is
obviously based on rules and principles which more or less assume free
market-oriented economies," it may well make sense to seek ways of
"incorporating" non-market economies into this system." Although
Jackson acknowledges that "the assimilation of China into the GAIT is
a formidable task," he feels an "interface" mechanism might distinguish
those aspects of the international regime which might be applied prima
facie to non-market economies as if their trade was normal, and those
situations which would need to be bargained into correspondence, by
analogy, constructed costs, and so forth. 97
Jackson's political vision is equally open textured. Although he in-
vokes the specter of a dark national parochialism to orient the vigilance
of his new economic diplomats and managers, it is hard to identify a
national partisan political program which cannot be accommodated by an
appropriate "interface." Perhaps only secretive or duplicitous policies
which do not make themselves available to reciprocal bargaining. But
195. For example, Jackson proposes "specificity," "cross border effects," "per se
violations" to assist "administrability," and a de minimus cut-off rule. Id. at 270-71.
All these would render the subsidy subject to scrutiny as similar in its identifiability
to the tariff as possible. Id.
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such policies, he seems sure, are likely in any event to be counterpro-
ductive and hard to sustain. Along with sovereignty, the new interdepen-
dence has eroded the possibility for a national regulatory state to pursue
purely selfish policies without taking account of international pressures.
At the same time, "interdependence" does not inaugurate a new inter-
national political order. Jackson does not propose that an international
regime legislate a liberal trade order. He finds the basic legal terms far
too ambiguous to sustain a project of regime building. In any event,
Jackson has left the public international lawyer's geography of interna-
tional "planes" and national sovereign "spheres" behind in favor of a
relentlessly fragmented order of conflicting sites and subjects for interna-
tional bargaining and regulation. Public international lawyers typically
concluded their polemics with a concrete proposal for action by con-
cerned international policy scientists and politicians: build an internation-
al court, administration, and eventually legislature, which might then
pursue an international politics of development, peace, redistribution, or
regulation. In its place, Jackson leaves us only with participation in an
already ongoing process of "management." "The problem of international
economics today, then, is largely a problem of 'managing' interdepen-
dence."'98 The public international policy process has been replaced by
decentralized adjustment and bargaining by managers and economic
diplomats acting out of an invigorated liberal commercial spirit and
vigilant against reassertions of national particularism.
In the final chapter, Jackson assesses the "trade constitution" of the
GATT system. Although it "operates better than any one had reason to
expect,"'" he nevertheless acknowledges that it "clearly ... is defec-
tive."200 He surveys at length the "weaknesses," "infirmities," and
"gaps" in the system: there are too many loopholes, the legislative ma-
chinery is defective, much economic activity remains outside the GATr,
procedures are confused, rule implementation is lax. Rather than pro-
posing construction of a new international regime which might amelio-
rate these faults, Jackson treats as a matter of fact the regime he has
imagined as a constitution, and then focuses on ways to "manage inter-
dependence" in this situation. He suggests that the manager will need to
mix a number of "techniques," including those given prominent mention
198. Id. at 4.
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in the book: harmonization, reciprocity, and interface.2" The resolution
of practical dilemmas concerning the appropriate mix of political and
economic objectives, or the appropriate role for law and the distribution
of power between courts and administrative officials, is left to the prac-
tice of economic diplomats and managers. These managers will mesh
political, legal, and economic considerations, acting as both public and
private officials both nationally and internationally.
For Jackson, traditional questions about the politics of international
law are simply not easily answered. Jackson asks, for example, whether
the "world trading rules are fair to developing countries."2' It turns
out that the relevant rules are "remarkably vague and 'aspirational,"' and
although a few discriminate on their face against developing countries,
some seem to favor them.Y But Jackson does not dwell on the point,
for "this subject has been extensively treated elsewhere and generally
involves the expertise of economists rather than lawyers."25 He sug-
gests that a "deeper" analysis might well reveal that the predominance
of large powerful countries in the institutions of the world trading sys-
tem puts developing countries at somewhat of a disadvantage,2" ,or
might focus on the "question of debt."" 7 On the other hand, develop-
ing countries "are able to take advantage of either explicit or implicit
exceptions in GATJ so as to to [sic] pursue almost at will any form of
trade policy they wish."2 °s In the end, Jackson leaves these questions
"to works that are more focused on the economic considerations of
world trade."2" International economic law begins where the policy re-
sponses to these difficulties leave off, treating their resolution, wise or
unwise, as matters of fact.
An imaginary trade constitution, liberal trade ideas, national and inter-
national political judgments, a decentralized regime of bargained reci-
procity: Jackson presents all these as facts rather than commitments. It
is a strategic epistemology-the cosmopolitan's accrediting claim and
aura of contact with reality are a matter of its internal narrative. As a
result, that Jackson presents himself as a realist means more that he pre-
fers a case-by-case approach or is sophisticated about the erosion of
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sovereignty and avoids utopian schemes.
His realism, like that of the typical public international law scholar, is
also a rhetorical device. Both display their awareness of the limits, am-
biguities, and illusions of a legal and policy argument which relies on
the traditional vocabulary of sovereignty. Both invoke a world of facts
outside of law-in anthropology or economics or politics-which will
operate as a check on law's illusions. Both place an interpretive project
of responding to these facts center stage as a project of personal and
professional commitment by members of their audience. For both, this is
a largely technical project-deploying the "technique" of law or "manag-
ing" interdependence-which holds out a general political vision of
peace or economic security as a distant promise and modest hope. It is
here that we encounter the policy pragmatist as a polemicist, situated in
a cultural dialogue with an audience-a lav faculty, law students-that
they might experience immersion in the technocratic as mobilization for
a cause.
Beyond highlighting this common pragmatic or realist international
style, reading Jackson focuses one on the ongoing development in the
field of international legal commentary generated by a continuing duet
between their quite different, if equally pragmatic, sensibilities. A main-
spring of that development is the repeated deployment of this rhetorical
realism as a criticism of each generation by its successors. The apparent
renewal of this relationship to the real gives policy pragmatism a pro-
gressive sensibility, constantly working against past abstractions for
future engagement. The result is a continually contested intellectual
terrain, hurrying toward an internationalist ideal against a projected fac-
tual backdrop, generating-almost as a by-product-a technocratic re-
gime of rejected sovereignties and political dreams.
The dialogue between the relative sensibilities of a public internation-
al lawyer and Jackson seems to address the difficulties of this interna-
tional regime, its technocratic excesses and political weaknesses. The
public international lawyer-hip and pragmatic-mobilizes governments
to both multilateralism and internationalism. His expectations are modest,
but the direction is sure. He sets himself against what he interprets as
the cosmopolitan's defeatist attitude toward public order or ideological
commitment to private ends and domestic laws. He will renew the inter-
national political order there should be built a great ark for international
policy, many cubits in all directions, and there should be assembled all
forms of public life for embarkation.
Meanwhile, the cosmopolitan international economic lawyer reinvents
the terms of policy debate, placing governments and companies in an
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idealized and incessant process of market bargaining, developing a cos-
mopolitan 6lan at once vigilant against parochial politics and open to the
widest range of policy choices. He understands the technocratic regime
as a political process-at once liberal, ecumenical, and modest-and
recruits managers who will use it in the right spirit. The cosmopolitan
sets himself against the public international lawyer's idealism and nostal-
gic romance with international institutions and regulatory regimes.
When the public international lawyer explains the evolutionary urgen-
cy of his task, the cosmopolitan can only smile at his naivete. But when
the international economic lawyer talks about the end of the regulatory
state, the obsolescence of national regulation, and the new interdepen-
dence, the metropolitan looks up from his work and agrees. He knows
this all already. That is why he is building an ark.
